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1 Any state, when constructing a central location of power and wealth, at the same time
also creates other areas that are seen from the centre as ‘remote’. The Russian state in its
Tsarist,  Soviet and post-Soviet variants is no exception ; indeed the geographer Boris
Rodoman has argued (2004) that Russia provides an extreme example of centricity. It
concentrates  all  lines  of  power,  infrastructure,  and  communications  towards  the
metropolis  — and  this  has  generated  a  particular  pattern  of  ‘remoteness’  across
provincial regions. The spatial pattern identified by Rodoman locates such remote areas
especially at administrative boundaries, as will be discussed below. This paper will discuss
the consequences of such a pattern in relation to the Russian-Mongolian border. This is a
sparsely  inhabited  region  where,  broadly  speaking,  the  border  coincides  with  an
ecological frontier : the mountainous taiga forests of Siberia with well-watered valleys
give way here to the dry and open grasslands of Mongolia. However, the argument made
by the geographers is not about ecology but essentially about political structures. It is
inattention from the state administration that produces undeveloped and cut off places.
The perception that such an area is ‘remote’ comes from outside, from people located in
cities. With the dramatic shifts in the meaning attributed to such places in the post-Soviet
era, urban residents now often see these places as somehow culturally authentic, to be
‘rediscovered’ and their secrets opened up (Humphrey in press). But such an external
perspective  leaves  almost  unexamined  the  real  lives  of  the  people  living  in  remote
frontier zones, in particular their experience and concepts of space and borders. In this
paper I shall argue that the Buryats of the borderlands have an alternative vision of social
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space,  and  that  this  is  not  simply  a  different  autochthonous  register  but  rather  a
profound  otherness  that  has  to  be  seen  as  ‘minoritarian’  and  hence  related  to  the
hierarchical state order of Russia. The Buryat spatial-social form is in many ways the
converse  of  that  of  the  state. This  could  be  seen  conceptually  as  a  Lévi-Straussian
‘structural opposition’ against the state order, but in this paper I shall take a different
approach to show how it is the outcome of an ethnically specific way of inhabiting, and
orienting to external spaces, in newly isolated lands. 
2 There is now an extensive anthropological literature on life in contemporary rural Siberia
(see Donahoe et al. 2008) and especially on Buryatia (Gomboev 2006 ; Nanzatov et al. 2008 ;
Skrynnikova ed. 2009 ; Popkov ed. 2009 ; Rinchinova 2011 ; Shaglanova 2010, 2011). This
paper frames its study in a particular way, by focusing on the rural lacunae in areas
between administrative entities, zones from which the tentacles of the state have been
almost completely withdrawn, and where a literally de-modernised life is going on. In
these places Buryat ideas of boundaries have been revitalised in recent years. Although
the Buryat concepts refer to their own history and legends, because these people have
always lived in the interstices of  alien state structures (Russian,  Mongolian,  Manchu,
Chinese) in practice some of the Buryat boundaries coincide with recent (Soviet) and
contemporary borders ; but they are conceptualised in quite different ways.  Thus for
these rural Buryats ‘the same’ border or boundary may have several overlaid meanings. 
Let me explain the specific sense in which I shall examine this phenomenon. As Nadya
Nartova has rightly observed all state borders are seen differently by the various actors
engaged with them,  such as  customs officials,  migrants,  tourists,  smugglers,  or  lorry
drivers, and she suggests the engaging idea of the hologram as a way to conceptualise the
concentration of different perspectives on one object (Nartova 2010, pp. 268-73). I wish,
however, to focus not on individual perceptions of borders but the way they appear in
common Buryat understandings of landscape, relatedness, and extra-local geo-political
articulations. It will be suggested that just as the hierarchical ‘vertical’ structure of the
Russian  state  produces  ‘remoteness’,  a  ‘horizontal’  idea  that  in  Slavic  culture  also
corresponds with depth (glub’, glubinka), it happens that the Buryats’ notions concerning
borders also relate verticality with expanse. Their ideas, however, are the reverse of the
Russian, since in the Buryat case the distant edge (boundary, border) is identified with
height and sacredness, and also — paradoxical as it might seem — with centricity.
3 Ultimately  I  aim to relate  the boundary consciousness  of  rural  Buryats  living in the
border  zone  to  their  contemporary  historical-geographical  situation,  namely  their
positioning both within a modern state as stranded within ‘remoteness’ and beyond it as a
historically  mobile  minority  that  uses  its  own  ideas  to  give  this  placing  a  different
meaning.
 
The spatial order of the Russian state
4 For an analysis of how remoteness has been produced in Russia I turn to the work of Boris
Rodoman. By the 2000s,  aghast at  urban sprawls,  reckless agricultural  expansion and
industrial destruction of wild lands Rodoman argued (2004) that Russia had developed an
‘anisotropic’ society, one in which vertical links are very strong, while horizontal ones
are weak. The administrative-territorial division of Russia, especially under the Soviet
government,  was  a  demonstration  of  this. The  state  amalgamated  all  vital  activities
(political,  social,  economic,  ethnic)  into  one  uniform  system. The  transport  system
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became the reflection of the administrative divisions, and vice versa, and the radial roads
that connected the centre with the periphery were a manifestation of the power vertical. 
The lines of communication prioritised were those that connected the capital with the
regional centres, the provincial party leader with the district subordinates, and the raion
(district) bosses with the directors of enterprises. Today also, in rural areas the only roads
kept in good repair are those used by the authorities (nachal’stvo). Other side roads die
out. The absence of lateral connections is the weak aspect of the anisotropic society :
many roads, bridges, public transport, and more generally the social links, that in pre-
Soviet times used to connect settlements with one another, no longer exist. 
5 Rodoman argues that this structure operates on different scales in the same way. Thus,
the same centre-focused organisation is found in Russia as a whole, in each Republic and
Oblast, and in districts (raion) and down to the lowest level. Because this order applies not
only to roads, but also to public transport, communications, distribution of supplies, and
allocation of funds, it creates enormous inequalities, which people feel very strongly at
each level. If  we apply his  idea to Buryatia,  there is  a  huge difference in prosperity
between  life  in  the  capital  Ulan-Ude  and  some  outlying  district  centre  of  the  same
Republic, and a similarly great one between the district centre and the poverty-stricken
villages in its peripheries. The acute experience of this inequality, combined with the
ability to compare one’s own with other places, is central to post-Soviet experience. The
centric structure also provides a mode of geographical orientation. In Russia, Rodoman
writes, ‘I can always sense where the centre is and where is the periphery, in any village,
in any forest  I  can feel  it,  where is  our  centre and our  edge (okraina),  which is  the
direction of Moscow’ (2004, p. 3).
6 Rodoman continues that what is significant about this pattern is that a decaying zone (
upadochnaya zona) tends to occur on the edges of each Oblast, even Moscow Oblast. Since
this is true for each administrative unit the borders between them turned into a kind of
vacuum. ‘Where three boundaries meet in one place,  real  godforsaken pockets (‘bear
corners’  medvezhie  ugly)  result’  (2004, p. 5). Today,  these  border  zones  are  where
depopulation  is  strongest,  where  there  are  fewest  villages  and  those  that  exist  are
decaying. 
7 Note that the adjective upadochnaya,  which could be translated as ‘falling’, refers to a
vertical drop ; in other words, the zones at the edge are also the ones ‘below’. Russian
vocabulary referring to remote places includes the idea of distance or farness (udalennost’
), but also in everyday speech to depth. Thus the rural hinterlands are commonly known
as glubinka (from glubina, depth, deep places, also heart or interior) and such places in an
abandoned, overgrown state are known as glush’ (roughly translatable as ‘backwoods’).
 
Living in ‘remoteness’
8 The Buryat villages along the Russian border with Mongolia would no doubt be described
by urban dwellers in exactly these terms. Indeed they are triply subject to the spatial
order described by Rodoman, since they are located at the peripheries of the Russian
state, of the Buryat Republic and the Zabaikal’skii Krai, and also of the districts that lie
along the border (Oka, Tunka, Zakamna, Dzhida, Kyakhta, etc.). In addition to languishing
in neglected ‘remoteness’ as Rodoman would have predicted, they are also enclosed and
cut off by the international frontier from the countries on the other side. The border
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districts were given the special administrative status of a ‘border zone’ (pogranichanaya
zona) with specific legislation related to security (Nanzatov & Sodnompilova 2012a, p. 
165). A large military force is maintained at Kyakhta, which is now the only crossing point
for road traffic still open to Mongolia from Buryatia (a nearby crossing for rail traffic is
nearby at Naushki). The Buryat-Mongolian border is 1,213 km long, and a number of
other crossing points used to exist ; but in the last twenty years many of them became
inactive and in 2010 all  were closed ‘for  security reasons’. This  means that  to go to
Mongolia the inhabitants along the frontier have to travel inwards to a local centre and
then out again to the crossing points at Naushki / Kyakhta. 
9 Formerly, the Buryats used to cross the border in many places in the course of their
normal economic activity. Their main livelihood was based on nomadic livestock herding
and the summer pastures of some communities were located in Mongolia. In Soviet times
Buryat collective farms, including some located at distance from the border, took their
sheep to Mongolia and mowed hay there annually (Humphrey 1986), and people often
crossed the border for hunting and gathering. Many Buryats visited relatives in northern
Mongolia and attended family festivals, etc. without hindrance. Now, with the post-Soviet
tightening of the border regime, maintaining relations with kin in Mongolia has become
difficult and more intimidating ; people do still make the journey but ‘secretly’ according
to Nanzatov and Sodnompilova (2012a, p. 165), which probably means that they cross the
border illegally. One of the legislative differences applying to inhabitants of the border
zone is that they are allowed (as are Mongols on the other side) to travel to nearby
districts of Mongolia without a visa. But the number of vehicles that can cross at Kyakhta
is limited by a slow, restrictive regime at the crossing point. A further hindrance is that
the settlements immediately adjacent to the border on the Russian side,  such as the
entire town of Kyakhta, are subject to additional frontier security limitation ; they are
‘closed zones’,  accessible  only  to  those  with  residence  documents  or  special  permits
granted by the FSB, and this deflects private investment in such zones. So for all these
reasons  the  cross-border  contacts  and  visa-free  travel,  that  might  in  principle  have
alleviated  the  boundary  torpor  pointed  to  by  Rodoman,  does  not  in  fact  result  in
economic development or a thriving border trade. 
10 Buryats — and in fact anyone — living in the border zone thus find themselves more
‘remote’, in the sense of cut off, than they were in Soviet days. Each district has its own
small and generally sleepy town as administrative centre ; and then spread out over a
vast  area are villages separated by mostly unused grasslands,  forests and mountains. 
Characteristically the Buryat settlements are not built directly on main roads, but a few
kilometres off  to the side,  reachable by uneven sandy tracks. In summer 2013, I  met
Buryat villagers of Yonkhor, who were trying to make a success of horse herding for meat
production,  but  they  bemoaned  the  difficulties  of  life  when  their  long  access  road
regularly became impassable during the year. The collective and state farms of the region
have long since  closed down,  leaving ruins  in  each village. Institutions  that  used to
connect the villages with towns,  such as schools,  post-offices,  medical  and children’s
centres,  and culture clubs,  have disappeared (see picture 1). Public transport services
have been reduced or shut, and those that exist are expensive. In most large villages
there are a few larger  private farms,  the so-called ‘peasant  enterprises’  (krestyanskoe 
khozyaistvo), but these tend to employ outside workers and the proceeds are generally set
aside  for  the  owners  to  purchase  accommodation  in  the  city  and  leave  the  village
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(Skrynnikova ed. 2009, p. 108). Many other residents have already left, and their houses
are now boarded up. 
 
Picture 1. Shrine on the road between Chita and Ulan-Ude at the pass over the Yablonevyi Mountain
range (July 2007)
Sayana Namsaraeva
11 The remaining villagers produce their own subsistence on small plots. As there is so little
paid employment money reaches most households regularly only from state pensions and
allowances. It is uneconomical to sell meat, milk, butter or vegetables in distant towns
because of lack of transport and market fees. Credit and new agricultural technology are
unavailable. The  result  of  all  this  is  that  the  ordinary  villagers  are  economically
unambitious and generally produce only what they need for apared down existence. 1
Skrynnikova ed. 2009, p. 76) note, ‘In conditions of chronic absence of money, making use
of nature has become the only way to survive…in fact, there has been a return to the
traditions of natural appropriative economy.’
12 In fact, there is no question of a ‘return’, as Buryats never used to live in this way in the
past. In the pre-Soviet period they did not live year round in close-packed villages and did
not depend on hunting and potato production. They moved seasonally between winter
and summer pasture areas with herds of cattle, sheep, goats and horses, and sometimes
did some agriculture on the side. Their settlements (ulus) varied in size, the winter being
larger than the summer ones, and the houses or yurts were widely dispersed. The current
compact village pattern arranged around communal facilities, such as the collective farm
office,  the shop,  the well,  and the club,  was inherited from the Soviet  era. But now,
because they no longer have a collective farm or local  industry to unite them, these
villages are isolated from one another. The memory of the former Soviet organisation
makes the large empty intervals between them seem bleak. When I once mentioned the
beauty of the empty grasslands stretching up to the hills and dotted with groves of pine
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and  cedar  trees,  a  woman exclaimed,  ‘I  hate  those  trees! They  just  sow themselves
anywhere and no one does anything. I cannot forget that that land used to be productive
fields.’ 
13 The  administrative  and  physical  isolation  of  ‘remoteness’  is  tempered  by  modern
technology. Many households have cars, though they often cannot afford to run them. 
More important are TVs, radios, computers and mobile phones. These, especially phones,
have become central to managing daily life, and everyone is aware of the areas where the
signal is strong and where it is weak. In describing the life in these places it is necessary
to remind readers that most of the people I have been calling ‘villagers’ are well educated
and many have held responsible positions or been trained for specific work (librarian,
accountant,  mechanic,  medical  assistant,  etc.)  that  no  longer  exists. Now,  perforce
confined to the village for long periods,  they turn their attention to the village as a
society. Each settlement I visited seemed to contain at least one person who was devoted
to  chronicling  the  history  of  that  place,  its  ancestors,  notable  inhabitants,  and  the
elaborate genealogies of the kinship groups living there. In summer sporting events, the
competitors’ village origin is always mentioned, so it is as though the villages are teams
challenging one another. 
14 If  all  this  suggests  a  village-focused  sociality,  there  are  nodes  where  the  localised
economy links to the greater economy of the country. Traders, who as in Mongolia are
often  women (Pedersen 2006),  sell  village  produced  meat,  potatoes,  furs,  etc.  in  the
capital of Ulan-Ude. Timber logged nearby is transported to the nearest railway head. The
business-people / mediators in such transactions, at least in my experience, are usually
outsiders. Meanwhile all the villagers can calibrate their position, and one simple way
this is done is by comparing — and lamenting — prices. For them the locality is thus not
only  laden  with  a  multiplicity  of  inward  meanings  and  feelings,  but  is  also  a  place
understood as a model that articulates with, and can be compared with, large extra-local
geopolitical entities (see Stasch 2013). They often look outwards to the great Russia in
which they are situated. Their gaze tends to follow the trajectory of those who have left
the  village  for  the  towns,  often  their  own departed children,  the  vertical  hierarchy
mentioned by Rodoman ; they do not compare the locality with any ‘sideways’  place,
some Sretensk or Orel, but look directly ‘upwards’ first to the nearby town, then to the
Republic capital,  and most of all  to distant Moscow, the centre of power, wealth and
prosperity. People  thus  have  an  acute  sense  that  they  live  in  remote  obscurity  in
Moscow’s terms, and yet, as I shall describe the Federal hierarchical is not the only, or
even the primary, sense they make of the geography of their situation.
 
The international border : looking over to the other
side as a citizen of Russia
15 Rodoman’s argument concerned primarily borderlands between internal administrative
entities  and  the  international  border  presents  a  somewhat  different,  more  complex
situation. Other Russian geographers have expressed the hopeful view that international
borders are areas of contact rather zones of closure ; they have become ‘nodes of growth’
where people learn new ideas and technologies not from the inaccessible centre but from
their  foreign neighbours (Kagansky 2010, p. 36). This  idea has  limited applicability  to
Russian-Mongolian border. On Buryat  websites  the impending massive growth of  the
Mongolian economy is discussed with a mixture of amazement and envy, but there is
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little mention of learning from there.2 At the border itself, Russian citizens seem to have
rather negative opinions of  the ‘mentality’  of  the Mongols. One resident of  Kyakhta,
combining ethnic stereotyping with a feat of self-Orientalisation, described the Mongols
as cunning,  unreliable,  and ‘born traders’,  who ‘unlike us get up early at four in the
morning with only one thought in their heads, “How can I make money today”, and they
do everything to achieve their goal. But our people sleep in ; they come to work (if there
is work) and do it just somehow, or they simply spend time there and that’s all, with no
idea  of  working  to  earn. The  idea  doesn’t  even  come into  their  heads.’ He  accused
Mongols of using the local visa regime to come over to Kyakhta, impudently ignoring the
travel restrictions and taking multiple jobs, while Russian citizens who go to Mongolia
are constantly afraid of the authorities (Nanzatov & Sodnompilova 2012b, pp. 60-61). In
practice quite a few Buryats from the town do engage in various small schemes with
partners across the border — buying petrol to re-sell,  exchange of meat for potatoes,
currency  speculation,  day-work  as  ‘camels’  (transporters)  for  traders,  and  so  forth. 
Elsewhere, some smuggling takes place across the border via obscure paths in the forests
known to locals.3 One Buryat from Kyakhta, a driver and minor entrepreneur, said to me,
‘The border will always feed you.’ But he also grumbled at the restrictions ; and said that
of course the closure of the entire length of the border (apart from Kyakhta and Naushki)
renders traffic in any other place strictly illegal. 
16 The international border is a highly complex and densely over-layered interface between
different kinds of social agency and spatial perception. It encodes, for example, a social
fault line, which can be seen in hostilities such as cross-border cattle raiding. This is in
fact a ‘scalar’ phenomenon, mirroring administrative divisions, since livestock theft is
reported to be particularly prevalent inside Russia on the borders between the districts,
and between the villages within one district (Nanzatov et al.  2008, p. 200). The crucial
moral injunction is that one should not steal from one’s own people — but ‘one’s own’
may be defined more widely, or more narrowly. Such relative, or scalar, fault lines appear
also  in  perception  of  occult  social  realms,  which  also  sometimes  coincide  with
administrative and/or socio-economic divisions. An example of this way of thinking can
be seen from the following contribution to a Buryat online forum : ‘There was such a
‘meat king’ in our village — that’s what they called him after he was revealed to have
been a cattle thief. No one would talk to him. And after a while his daughter died ; she
burnt  out  from  cancer  in  just  six  months’.4 It  was  l eft for  forum  participants  to
understand that this illness was not an accident ; it was a punishment by the spirits. The
spirits are territorial beings, attached to areas with boundaries marked by barisa shrines,
and this also applies to the shamans, who master their own spirits but not those from
neighbouring lands. Thus, in the case of the international border, it is not surprising to
learn that Zakamensk Buryats say of their Mongol neighbours, ‘They have very strong
shamans ; they can send very powerful curses — zhadkha khayana5 — which can bring
harm to more than one generation of our people.’ Meanwhile, on the other side of the
international  border  the  same  kind  of  threat  is  seen  as  coming  from  the  Buryats. 
Nanzatov and Sodnompilova conclude, ‘So this is how they live, afraid of one another on
each side of the border, people who have kinship links and common ancestors, yet they
have already become “Mongols” and “Buryats” to one another’ (2012b, p. 60).
17 However,  politico-administrative  and  occult  divisions  do  not  always  coincide. 
Ethnography from a more eastern section of  the border presents a different picture,
where the more mobile Buryats of the Khori-Aga group of clans live on both sides of the
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Russian-Mongol and the Russian-Chinese frontiers. In these regions shamanism unites
more  than  divides  people : the  Russia-based  Buryat  shamans  travel  to  their  kin  in
Mongolia and China to learn ‘authentic traditions’ lost during the Soviet period, while the
Buryats living in China and Mongolia travel to Russia to visit their homeland (nyutag) and
the places of their ancestral spirits (Namsaraeva 2010, 2012 ; Shimamura 2004). This case
shows that there are registers of ideas of space and place that override, or exist in a
different mode from, the divisions created by centralised states. Indeed, I shall argue in
the next section that there is a Buryat geography whose structure is the converse of that
of the hierarchical state.
 
An alternative sacred geography
18 Buryats prefer to live in the open, treeless grasslands of wide valleys (see picture 2). Their
villages are not usually located beside the rivers (gol), which may flood, but some distance
away, often nestled in a sheltered area at the foot of hills. A large valley system, such as
that of the Dzhida, Barguzin or Chikoi Rivers, has a number of branch valleys that are
separated from one another by forests and low-rising hills. These hills, as well as the high
mountains on the periphery, are studded with sacred sites of various kinds : notably, the
oboo (a cairn of stones), the shandan (a shaman’s grave), the barisa (a tree or pole on which
people tie ribbons, zalama), and the arshaan (a sacred spring) (Galdanova 1992 ; Gomboev
2006). 
 
Picture 2. Climbing to the Alkhanai mountain oboo (Duldurginskii district, Zabaikal’sk Region, July
2008)
Sayana Namsaraeva
19 On the ground the topography of these sacred sites is not random, and yet nor is it simply
a ‘cultural construction of nature’, for Buryats like other Mongolic people have an acute
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awareness of the inherent capacity for meaning of mountains, cliffs, rivers, or prominent
rocks or trees — their shapes, orientation, reflection of sunlight, and likeness to human or
animal images (Humphrey 1996, p. 86 ; Pedersen 2011, p. 14). Since the Buryats prefer a
pattern of habitation in a valley-plain surrounded by mountains, their ideal landscape has
the form of a broad bowl. 
20 Oboo, the most socially important of the sacred sites, are constructed on the tops of the
mountains that dominate the valleys. It is here that communities regularly gather to pay
their respects to the spirits (gazaryn ezhed ‘spirit masters of the land’) that govern the
blessings, fertility, prosperity of the inhabitants of the area — or alternatively, if angered,
send them misfortunes, illness and early death. The oboo cairns are said to be the ‘seats’ (
suudal / huudal) of the spirits, who may come and go, but have their main abode on the
mountain. Most  of  these spirits  are  the transformed ‘souls’  of  ancestors  of  local  kin
groups.6 On the same mountainsides, or nearby in the forests, are the worshipped grave-
sites of deceased shamans, male and female (Abaeva 1992, p. 78) and it is at these places
that new shamans are often consecrated (Gomboev 2006, pp. 95-96). Stories about these
remarkable ancestors and shamans constitute the history of social groups — and they are
sometimes  the  main discursive  basis  of  the  groups’  existence. In  Buddhist  areas  the
mountain master-spirits will have been given the Tibetan name of a deity. But in any
case, the plethora of sacred places surrounding a valley is linked by social relationships to
the communities living at the foot of the mountains (see picture 3). When I travelled in
summer 2013 among the villages of the Buddhist Tsongol Buryats in the Chikoi River area,
I was told that each lineage (ug, yahan) in the neighbourhood had its own mountain with
an oboo, and that on the same day in summer the male members of each group would
climb up to their own site to ‘meet’ and make offerings to their ancestral spirits. Later in
the month, following these separate rites, the men of all the related lineages would join
together and go to the highest mountain of the vicinity for a common sacrifice.7 These
dominant mountains are called Khan (‘king’). Being so high, they are difficult to access,
and they are located on the edges of a system of communities.
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Picture 3. A village below the hills (Southern Buryatia, July 2013)
Caroline Humphrey
21 It can be seen already that this Buryat set of ideas contrasts strikingly with the Russian
state system. Instead of the latter’s conical model, with ‘height’ and political power at the
centre and ‘depth’ in the gaps and edges, the Buryat bowl-shaped vision locates highness
and spiritual lordship at the boundaries. Meanwhile the riverine middle is occupied by
ordinary people, who are differentiated only by kinship and/or which village they live in. 
The topographically central area, which is low-lying and not necessarily even inhabited,
has no obvious feature to align with political centricity. 
22 This  political  absence at  the heart  of  the Buryat  landscape must  be  related to  their
‘minoritized’  status,  to  fact  that  for  centuries  their  political  masters  have  been
‘foreigners’ (Russians, earlier Khalkha Mongolians) while their own potential hierarchies
were truncated at local levels. But it is also connected, I suggest, to the Buryats’ own
alternative understanding of political content, pattern and direction. To explain this, let
me  begin  with  the  strongly gendered  conceptual  and  affective  aura  of  mountains. 
Nanzatov  et  al. (2008 , pp. 52-60)  have  observed  that  the  worshipped  mountain  is  a
‘masculine’ idea, contrasted with rivers, lowlands and marshes. The mountain is invoked
as the seat of the patrilineal ancestors and past leaders of a kin group (‘clan’, ‘tribe’).8
Women and males of other clans are generally forbidden to climb up the sacred mountain
and to attend the holy rites at its oboo, a prohibition that is linked both to the impurity
(for men) of menstrual blood and to the fact that, because of the practice in principle of
exogamy, the category of married-in women at any given place are seen as foreign to the
clan (Nanzatov et al. 2008, pp. 52-53 ; Shaglanova 2010). The male mountain spirits, the
khada-uulyn-übeged (lit. ‘respected old men of cliffs and mountains’), represent the notion
of the originating fount-leader of an exclusive patriarchal group. This is also a scalar
vision. Such local kin groups are nested within more inclusive categories — e.g. the ‘seven
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clans’  in the border area originating from western Buryat lands and the ‘eight clans’
originating from the east and Mongolia9 — and it is these broader agglomerations that
worship the great King (‘Khan’) mountain spirits, which operate on a more expansive
scale and wider territory. In such cases the spirit, such as Burin Khan becomes as almost
deity-like figure, usually pictured as a mounted warrior brandishing weapons. 
23 This is a martial image that is common to land deities across Inner Asia, yet it is not
purely conventional — there are old Buryat people who claim to have seen Burin Khan
with their own eyes and who are able to describe the colour of his horse, his clothing and
bows and arrows (Abaeva 1992, p. 79). What is notable about this kind of master-deity is
not only that he can appear to people as a visible ‘presence’ but also that he stands as the
content of a particular conception of power. He is not so much imagined as governing us,
like a Russian ruler, as dispensing fortune, defending against demons, and ensuring the
continuation of our group through generations — if only we respect the natural order
over which he presides. Yet real-life local headmen, and even government officials (at
least in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia) make sure to take charge of the main oboo rite of
their region. The political leadership represented at oboo is not real-politik, but it is a
demonstration of hierarchical social status.10 At the same time, power here is imagined
not as located in living humans, but derived from the autochthonous spirits of nature
(into  which  the  ancestors  have  transformed),  a  power  that  confers  the  blessed
reproduction and good fortune of social groups, whether these be defined by kinship,
territory or political allegiance. In the post-Soviet era, there is renewed vigour in the
notion that  this  power-energy-fortune  (Mong.  sülde,  Bur.  hülde)  is  necessary  for  any
person wishing to succeed in worldly politics. At the same time, as Buryats say, hülde also
is the gift of fertility. Childless couples go to sacred mountains to pray for a baby, and, if
the wish is granted, the child is known as ‘born of the mountain spirit’ (Nanzatov et al.
2008, pp. 55, 215).
24 So far my account has been similar to the description given by Morten Pedersen of the
‘Shishged  Depression’  inhabited  by  Darkhad  Mongols  just  on  the  other  side  of  the
international frontier in the Khubsugul (Khövsgöl) region of Mongolia. It is worth briefly
discussing this case, since the Darkhad are minoritized within Mongolia in a way that is
not unlike the Buryats in Russia. The Shishged Depression is a wide valley surrounded by
mountains and forests, known by other Mongols as ‘a destitute, barbaric and shamanic
backwater, whose fate was always to hover on the edge of civilisation’ (Pedersen 2011, p. 
10). Pedersen observes that the largest and most important oboo of the southern Darkhads
is on the high Öl mountain pass, which marks the border between the Shishged and the
rest  of  Mongolia,  and  therefore  is  not  anywhere  near  the  town  of  Ulaan-Uul,  the
administrative centre (2011, p. 143).11 This is similar to the Buryat case, but Pedersen has
a  different  interpretation  from  mine  concerning  the  relation  between  edge  and
periphery.12 He  concludes  t hat  a  ‘weighty’  centred  steppe  opposes  the  ‘weightless’
counter-image of a marginal taiga [forest], a zone of pure multiplicity and metamorphosis
(2011, p. 146). This  idea,  however,  ignores  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  oboo type  of
centricity, which if I am right occurs at a joint between realms.
25 What significance does  this  notion of  edge-based centricity  have for  practical  life  of
Buryats? The oboo rites gather people who otherwise rarely meet to one spot. From their
various settlements, they drive most of the way and then climb up to the peak. The goal
of worship is not only for the elders, leaders and kin groups to gather blessings, but is
also directed towards practical concerns, such as the weather, the state of the pastures,
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attacks by predators, or epidemic diseases. In 1996, the Chairman of what was then still
the Karl Marx Collective Farm of Selenga District told me that when there has been a
drought recently, he had sent a group of men on horseback to make offerings at a distant
peak — one so high that the snow at the summit ‘reached the top of their boots’. This
expedition was to request rain for the farm’s fields.13
26 Some great oboo rites provide the occasion for a meeting of otherwise separate groups. 
How is this conceptualized? In Mongolic languages to go outwards is also to rise up, a
positive movement towards the sacred, while to return home is expressed by the same
word as to descend (buukh) (Nanzatov et al. 2008, p. 91 ; Bakaeva 2003, p. 237). Looking
upwards from the village, only one side of the mountain of course is visible and it appears
as an edge, beyond which nothing can be seen. But once at the top, a vast new vista opens
out, and it is of this entire expanse that the mountain is a centre. The notion is inherently
expansive. It includes both what is behind (below) us and what lies before us. This is why
a grand mountain will not only form the border between communities but also be the
point that links them, since people from the other side come to worship there too.14 In the
Buryat border zone people of all clans converge on the great mountain called Burin Khan,
coming from two directions : on the same day,  the 2ndnd of  the last  lunar month of
summer,  the  villages  of  Iro,  Udunga,  Tashir,  Selenduma  and  Nandi  arrive  from  the
eastern side and people from Inzagatui, Borgoi, and Ichetui come from the west. At the
summit there is a lake. Twelve small oboo are set in a circle surrounding one large oboo
and each of the small cairns is worshipped by a different clan (rod) (Abaeva 1992, p. 79).
27 Not only is one oboo multiple in this way, but mountains are held to be in relationship
with other mountains. In the case of the great peaks this expands the sacred geography
far beyond the next valley. These links are quite mysterious and difficult to understand,
with constellations of mountains existing on different scales. If Burin Khan is the ‘king’ of
the varied local cluster just mentioned, it is also a point in far wider network of grand
mountains,  some  of  which  are in  Mongolia. 15 Meanwhile  the  realm  of  each  great
mountain contains its  own internal  concatenation of lesser  mountains with different
characters.  During fieldwork in 1996 in Tashir,  I  was told that the nearby pleasantly
rounded mountain called Khongor-Uula was the wife of Burin Khan, and that Adkhata
mountain  near  Selenduma  was  his  son. Right  next  to  Khongor-Uula,  which  was
considered to be ‘calm’ (nomkhon), was another forested and somehow ungainly mountain
known as Kharuukha Emege Ezhi, a female spirit with a fierce, vengeful (dogshin) nature. 
Fewer people went there to pray than to the other mountains, though Nina, the Secretary
of  the  Trade Union,  attended regularly  as  she lived close  by. Meanwhile,  the  farm’s
territory also included a different and very powerful Emege Ezhi shrine — one of three
‘sisters’ whose seats were distributed across the borderlands of south Buryatia. High in
the  upland forests,  this  site  had only  recently  been constructed ; yet  already it  was
regularly  attended  twice  a  year  by  200-300  clan  members,  many  coming  from  long
distances.16 The example of Tashir seems similar to other places in the region, and it
makes clear that sacred mountains exist in scattered networks. 
 
A lived-in landscape
28 During most of the year no one goes near the peaks of sacred mountains,  which are
surrounded by many prohibitions,17 and women do not go there at all. Yet there are ways
in which the presence of mountain spirits are acknowledged daily. People often make
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libations to mountains from just outside their homes, at a distance. And mountains can
approach close :
There  is  a  saying  that  children  born  of  Khümüün  (Khumun)  Khan  [the  main
worshipped mountain of Tsongol Buryats] sometimes notice a vast shadow behind
them. The explanation for this is that Khümüün Khan keeps watch over his children
. (Nanzatov et al. 2008, p. 215)
29 It seems that it is the height, the ‘look’ and the aura of a given mountain that gives rise to
the sensation that it is a living presence, and also to the relational naming of mountains
in terms of gender / kinship categories. The characters of mountain spirits, especially the
maleficent,  are then linked to events — accidents,  illnesses,  cattle blight,  etc.  — that
people explain as caused by the spirit’s wrath at some person having cut wood, dug the
ground, or otherwise infringed the prohibitions surrounding the mountain. In the 1990s
in Tashir I had the impression that the linguistic expressions, ‘wife of’ and ‘son of’, were
shorthand for what must have been multiple affective and non-verbalised experiences of
living in the shadow of these mountains. Even I, as a stranger in Tashir, could sense the
counter-play of different mountain force fields, given that Burin Khan glimmered in the
barely  visible  distance,  whereas  benign  Khongor-Uula  and  the  evil,  tree-covered
Kharuukha Emege Ezhi loomed close by. The main road ran along at their foot. Each time
we drove anywhere, other hills would be passed without comment, but at these particular
mountains it was necessary to stop and make a libation of vodka to the spirits, for safety’s
sake.
30 What, however, do rural Buryats make of the spatial structures created by the state? At
one level they react to them in a matter of fact way like any other citizens of Russia, but
at the same time Buryats have their own histories that inflect and destabilise the common
ordinary  ideas. For  example,  there  is  a  Buryat  account  of  the  establishment  of  the
international  border  between Russia  and Qing Mongolia  by Count  Raguzinskii  in  the
1730s. According to this history, Raguzinskii asked for help from a Buryat guide called
Shodo, and he in turn had recourse to animal knowledge when delimiting the exact line
of the border. Shodo said that the boundary should be where the tracks of his horses led
when out at pasture, since ‘we know very well where our lands are, where our fathers
lived and their bones peacefully lie. Not only people, but our horses know.’ The horse
tracks  were  then  adopted  to  form  the  international  border (Nanzatov  et  al.  2008,
pp. 205-206). Two aspects of this story are significant : first, that, of all the domesticated
livestock kept by Buryats, horse herds are in fact the ones that graze furthest away, and
therefore  their  roaming  defines  the  extent  of  the  lands  that  a  given  community
practically use. Second, a song about this event that is sung to this day, lauds the idea of a
border that not only delimits ‘what is ours’ but also links us with others. In this song
Raguzinskii is praised as wonderful, for having ‘introduced us to peoples’ (2008, p. 206).
31 The  Buryats  have  thus  found a  way,  at  least  in  folkloric  history,  to  ‘naturalize’  the
international  border,  to  remove  the  sense  of  it  being  an  alien  imposition,  and  to
assimilate it to their own practices. This fits with the loyal stance towards the Russian
government that Buryats almost invariably assume in public. However, in the case of
roads, which are the sinews of the state structures that connect ‘down’ to the villages, we
find a far more ambivalent set of ideas with which I shall conclude this article. Indeed,
this is another facet of the reversal of the state geography : if lofty inaccessible mountains
are the epitome of ‘remoteness’ and yet valued by Buryats so highly, it turns out that
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main roads — which in principle should be their lifelines to towns and wealth — are in
some important respects disliked and feared by them.
 
Roads
32 Buryats, who in the past travelled on horseback, or with slow-moving carts and caravans,
would not have had much in the way of roads of their own. Their vocabulary reflects the
ideas of the road as a main route (zam), as cart tracks (zim), as a trace (of footsteps, Mong.
mör, Bur. mür), and as a path (khargui). Seasonal migrations to fresh pastures, the main
occasion for travel, would not involve specially constructed roads at all. A notional circle
was used to model actual transhumant journeys (though these were not usually circular
but more like an elongated loop) and this enabled the conceptualisation of the series of
pastures as a protected, encircled precinct (khüree) with the affective qualities of the idea
of  a  homeland  (nyutag).18 Roads  c onstructed  by  outside  authorities  for  their  own
purposes, coming from some unknown place and bisecting homelands, were a different
matter,  and  in  some  ways  dangerous. In  Tsarist  times  roads  brought  troubles : the
authorities would order Buryats to serve travelling officials, provide horses, carts and
food,  or  act  as  guards  for  columns  of  prisoners  stumbling  along  the  ‘penal  roads’  (
katorzhnyye puti) that led through Trans-Baikalia. 
33 Even now there is a sense that roads — the ordinary roads maintained by the Federal
Roadways Service — are dangerous. They lead out, elsewhere, to some other (unknown)
place, and hence potentially to an alien or hidden (daldyn) world. They belong to no one
alive. Evil  spirits,  as well  as ordinary people travel along them, particularly at night.
Hordes of ghosts may be met where three roads meet. Stories abound, such as that of the
group of boys and girls walking along the road to the club at night when they hear a
mysterious bell, which came closer and closer, and ‘suddenly I was thrown to the ground
by a blow. After that my mother yelled at me for walking along a road at night’ (Nanzatov
et al. 2008, p. 302). Humans should give way to travelling spirits (yabadal), whether these
are great ‘fate-spirits’ (zayaan) who use vehicles like officials, or small ones that travel on
horseback or on foot. Since the spirits take the middle of the highway, people are advised
to walk along the edges. It is forbidden to build a house on a former road, and also to light
a fire on a road, these being prohibitions that Nanzatov et al. (2008, p. 303) explain by the
conceptual contradiction between the domestic home, the hearth, and the very idea of a
road. For the same reason dwellings should not be sited beside a road, but safely at some
distance.
34 However, enforced collectivisation entailed the construction of Russian-type houses in
rows along roads. The idea behind this policy was not only the imposition of a cultural
pattern common to Russia but also the practical policy of gaining access to the scattered
population, providing services to them and at the same time control over them. In Soviet
times, the Buryat villagers must have balanced their fear / dislike of roads against the
advantages of closeness to the shop, the club, the school, the bakery, or the bus to town. 
But now almost all of these benefits have disappeared and the occult threats loom larger
than ever. Travelling with Buryats by car today one frequently stops at roadside offering
places called barisa (see picture 4) Scraps of cloth are tied to the shrine (often a tree),
coins, matches and other offerings laid down, and vodka is thrown to the spirits and also
consumed by the travellers. This is done to get protection from the dangers of travelling
the road itself, such as accidents, breakdowns or robbery. But the barisa also has other
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connotations. It commemorates ancient mythic tragedies. It may contain the ashes of a
deceased shaman in a secret crevice.19 It also is the gateway of a clan territory : people say
it is necessary to stop at these places to beg protection from the outside spirit-masters,
since in leaving one’s home area one also leaves behind the protection of one’s shamans.20
Even the Soviet boundaries were subject to a version of this practice, so for example, the
statue of Karl Marx which stood by the road to mark the entrance to the collective farm
became a kind of barisa. Incoming drivers would halt there, visitors leaving would say
their farewells there, and libations were made. The foot of the statue was heaped with
empty bottles, coins, etc.21 So the first thing to note is that Buryats deal with roads by
stopping the flow along them — and also that after a few such stops the journey carries on
in a state of inebriation, which we can perhaps see as mental abstracted from the act of
travelling.
 
Picture 4. A village scene (Southern Buryatia, July 2013)
Caroline Humphrey
35 Furthermore, in these borderlands that have been rendered increasingly ‘remote’, even
the most disbelieving and practical person is likely to see roads in a negative light ; local
roads are often impassable, transport is expensive and unreliable, and the road system
was planned for state purposes, not your own. Roads do not take the shortest route to
where local people may want to go, such as your mother’s village over the hills. And
finally, in the valleys by the border, with the closure of crossing points, roads turn into
dead-ends. At the furthest points of these roads there was hunger and destitution in the
1990s, and today still a sense of being marooned, abandoned. Roads are the connections of
rural people to the state that register in imagination the fears and disappointments in
this relationship.
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Conclusion
36 This paper has tried to explain the condition of ‘remoteness’ brought about by recent
changes in the economy and administration of Russia at its borders. The new isolation of
Buryat villagers, and their sense of being cast adrift to manage as best they can, has been
observed with dismay by local writers (Skrynnikova et al. eds. 2009, pp. 107-109). Studies
by Buryat ethnographers have documented an indigenous semiotics of space that seems
to have increasing vitality in the present day. My aim has been to show that these Buryat
understandings are not simply survivals from a timeless ‘traditional culture’ but closely
related — by means of contrast — to the state structures within which they live. I have
not  emphasized  Russian  nationalities  policy  towards  Buryats  (for  an  excellent
comparative survey, see Donahoe et al. 2008). Rather, the paper has drawn attention to
the more neglected topic of the geography created by the state. Hyper-centralisation, I
have argued following Rodoman, has systematically created areas of ‘remoteness’ at the
edge of administrative units at all scales — and in particular a vast and elongated area of
isolation along the Siberian border with Mongolia. Buryats, Russians and others living in
this  zone  are  subject  to  the  same  contemporary  conditions  of  withdrawal  of  state
services, lack of transport, unemployment, high prices, scarcity of money, and difficulty
in obtaining goods. From the perspective of Moscow officialdom there is a ‘geography of
ignorance’  (van Schendel  2002)  that  fails  to  acknowledge  these  zones  as  having  any
importance, and may hardly even register their existence. This is compounded by the
‘political geography of forgetting, silence and erasure’ (Grundy-Warr & Sidaway 2006)
that still occludes the histories of these people, which is no doubt related to the fact that
they criss-crossed the international frontier whose integrity was so jealously guarded by
the Russian state. It is for these reasons, rather than nationalities policy, that I  have
called the historical-geographical consciousness of the border people ‘minoritized’. The
epithet could as well be applied to some borderland Russian populations too, such as the
Old Believers and certain remnants of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks (Peshkov 2010), but the
Buryats  of  remote  valleys  are  a  particularly  vivid  case,  for  in  their  long  history  of
exception they have generated an understanding of spatial forms that is counter to that
known,  or  even  possible  to  know,  in  cities. In  this  sense  the  ‘remote’  Buryats  are
minoritized even in relation to their prosperous, Russian-speaking, urban co-ethnics. 
37 By allowing the contours of the land and their own lives in it to take precedence — or
rather to ‘take form’ as a set of spatial concepts and feelings — the Buryats counteract the
hyper-centric hierarchical  structure of  the Russian state. Without uttering a word of
opposition,  indeed maintaining a  loyal  stance,  they nevertheless  organise the crucial
ritual events of their lives around a notional protected hollow with powers located not in
the middle but at its rim, and thus they enact an utterly different vision. When the sacred
mountains at the edges are envisaged as pivots connecting one broad valley with the
next, and these, at a wider scale, connect the ‘hollows’ across a vast region, this can be
seen as a challenge to the state model, which has always insisted on a single, inviolate
international border line. What is perhaps most minoritarian about this vision is the
evacuation of any indigenous notion of political power in the depth of the hollow, in
other  words  the absence of  an idea of  static  authority  at  the  centre,  its  extrusion of
centricity to distant sacralised heights.22 In this way, it is as though people are living out,
without saying so, a refusal of the state version of what power is. It might be objected that
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I have described only some folkloric never-never land of superstition, but I hope I have
provided enough evidence that the mountains,  the boundary shrines and the sinister
roads are more than this : for villagers they are the ‘face of history’ (Stasch 2013, p. 566)
and they are points of concentrated memory and emotion to which people relate their
everyday lives. In these remote areas, boundaries are certainly conceived in terms of
defence and self-protection, but they also have a semantic richness entirely foreign to the
state version oriented to external enemies — since it is from these places on the rim that
a host of life- and death-related forces derive : ancestral blessings, fertility, prosperity
and the filaments of opening social connections.
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NOTES
1. Some more hard-working folk produce a little extra for exchange. This done through barter,
notably the exchange of home grown potatoes or meat for sacks of sugar, cans of oil, and clothing
brought to the villages by local traders. Most households keep 2 – 3 cows for milk and a few sheep
for festivals and ceremonies, and more rarely chickens and pigs. In this situation, hunting and
gathering have become important resources. Hunting is a very widespread occupation, not only
for furs, which can be sold, but also for meat. For Buryats meat is the central element of the diet,
and it is estimated that half of the meat consumed by villagers is now game from hunting. In
summer, women and children forage in the woods for pine nuts, berries, and mushrooms, which
are prepared for storage and consumption through the year, and also sold or exchanged when
possible. In these hunting and foraging activities, the laws concerning land property and hunting
seasons are widely ignored (Skrynnikova ed. 2009, p. 76).
2. See www.buryatia.org forum entitled ‘Dalekaya blizkaya Mongoliya’, accessed January 2013.
3. In 2010 along the Buryat part of the Russian-Mongolian border 130 people were arrested for
illegal crossing of the border and 360 for infringing the ‘border regime’ (i.e. traveling beyond the
permitted zone without a visa). The guards confiscated from the arrested 30 guns, 2,000 rounds
of ammunition, and narcotics (Nanzatov and & Sodnompilova 2012b, p. 50).
4. www.buryatia.org, forum entitled ‘Skotokrady’ p. 3, accessed December 2013.
5. Zhadkha khayana  : literally ‘to throw magic.’
6. ‘A significant proportion of the cult sites of Zakamna are for the worship of real ancestors
buried on the slopes of the highest mountain of the valley’ (Galdanova 1992, p. 109).
7. Among Ekhirit people in the border region, Baitag Mountain is the cult centre for all lineages
of the clan. The lower mountains surrounding it are attached to individual lineages and small
patri-focused  groups.  ‘Informants  link  a  specific  mountain  with  a  concrete  group  :  “Our
Markuseevs and Altaev have the Uuta Khada hill, but the Khushkheev have Malaan Khada hill”
(Nanzatov  et.  al.  2008).  In  other  areas  along  the  border,  the  basis  for  oboo worship  may  be
territorial,  i.e.  nearby  villages  and  hamlets,  rather  than  kin-based.  The  same  principle  still
obtains however  : smaller groups worship the lower mountains and they join together in wider,
more inclusive assembly to pay respects at the highest mountain (Galdanova 1992, pp. 109-110  ;
Abaeva 1992, p. 64  ; Natsagdorj, personal communication).
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8. Female ancestors (ütöödeinüüd lit. ‘respected old women’) are often linked to waters and lakes.
9. At the end of the oboo rites competitive games were held to entertain and honour the spirits. In
tales of the Zakamensk Buryats it was recounted that these used to set clan again clan, or even
the whole ‘western seven’  (baruun doloon)  versus the ‘eastern eight’  (züün naiman). When the
western side won in the wrestling or horse races, shamans from the eastern side would complain
that of course they had prevailed, since their most powerful and first ancestor, Bukha Noyon, had
intervened  to  help  his  team,  upending  and  tripping  eastern  competitors  with  his  horns
(Galdanova 1992, p. 110).
10. This is encoded in the roles of patron and leading officiant, and it is made evident by seating
patterns and the demeanour of elders at the ritual (Pedersen 2006, pp. 94-95).
11. In an illuminating earlier paper Pedersen argues that the Darkhad Mongols know two kinds
of centre, an intrinsic ‘absolute’ one represented by oboo and household hearths, and an extrinsic
‘relative’ one manifested in the District Centre and the state hierarchy. Different kinds of social
leadership are associated with the contrasting types of centre (2006, pp. 95-98). I would query
here only the adjective ‘absolute’, since it seems to me that the intrinsic form is also scalar and
relative.
12. To support this argument, Pedersen cites the (now-abandoned) Zhargalant Oboo, located on a
hilltop  close  to  the  geographical  centre  of  Shishged,  which  ‘played  the  role  of  a  spatial
technology’ that organised places and divinities around a central point in the form of a Buddhist
mandala (2011, p. 137). It should be noted, however, even these notional mandala patterns, i.e.
those read into the lands surrounding a monastery with its protective oboo, were not necessarily
imposed at geographically or administratively central locations. Monasteries as places of ascetic
retreat were ideally located at a distance from clusters of lay population.
13. Caroline Humphrey, fieldnotes, 1996, Tashir, Selenga District, Buryatia.
14. This was pointed out to me during recent fieldwork in Urad (Inner Mongolia),  where the
sacred peak called Shar Oroi, the seat of the land-master deity Muna Khan, forms the boundary
between the southern (öbür) and the northern (ar) Urads. These two populations have very little
contact apart from their common attendance at the annual rites for Muna Khan (even though
administratively they form one Banner).
15. Burin Khan is said to be one of the three King Mountains of the Trans-Baikal region known as
Ar-Khalkha (northern Khalkha, where ‘Khalkha’ denotes Mongolia), the others being Khümüün
Khan and Khügtei Khan (Abaeva 1998, p. 79). There are several other mountains in Buryatia and
across the border in Mongolia also called Burin Khan. It is not clear whether people in different
places had the same idea about their mountain (burin means ‘full’ or ‘complete’) or whether the
groups who historically moved northwards from Mongolia into Russia took their oboo with them
as they migrated, reconstituting it at each place (Nanzatov et al. 2008, p. 187).
16. The site was very large, consisting of the wooden shrine itself, a sacred tree, six big altars for
offerings of vodka, milk, bread/sweets, and mutton, and sixteen further tables and benches for
the worshippers’  feast.  A thread tied from tree to tree enclosed the whole precinct,  with an
opening to the south. The prayers were read in Tibetan by a lama. Women workers of the Milk
Production Brigade paid particular attention to worship of this Emege-Ezhi, a female spirit. It
was regarded as the master-spirit of the whole village, so incomers wishing to live there, such as
new brides, should request its permission before settling. Caroline Humphrey, fieldnotes 1996,
Tashir, Selenga District, Buryatia.
17. For example, trees on the mountain should not be cut down, springs not polluted by human
dirt, and even at a distance impure objects should not be thrown in the direction of the mountain
.
18. Bakaeva observes, confirmed by Nanzatov et. al. for Buryats (2008, p. 296), that for traditional
Kalmyks the annual migration was like a circle or spiral  :  ideally the journey, even if in fact
horizontal, should proceed ‘upwards’ (ööd) in the ‘right / west ’ (Mong. zöv, Bur. züb) direction,
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i.e.  following  the  movement  of  the  sun,  while  the  return  was  conceptualised  as  travelling
downwards  via  the  east  to  the  initial  stopping-place  (K.  buuts,  Bur.  buusa)  (Bakaeva  2003,
pp. 237-238).  Bakaeva  links  the  nomadic  migration  circle  to  other  notions  of  encircling
protection and interior harmony, such as that of the ger (round felt tent) (2003, p. 239).
19. Istvan Santha, personal communication, based on fieldwork among western Buryats.
20. It is dangerous for shamans to call on spirits in ‘foreign’ territories, and they will be punished
for this by the spirit-masters of that land (Nanzatov et al. 2003, p. 203).
21. Caroline Humphrey, fieldnotes 1995, Tashir, Selenga District, Buryatia.
22. In this respect, the sacred mountain landscape has a somewhat different character in the
interior of the independent state of Mongolia. Here, the city of Da Khüree / Ulaanbaatar has been
the fixed capital for at least two centuries, and the main Buddhist monastery is also located in
the city. In the metropolitan area, I  would argue, the worshipped mountains seem more like
adjuncts  to a  central  focus of  power,  arranged around it  for  its  benefit,  e.g.  the four sacred
mountains that ring Ulaanbaatar.
ABSTRACTS
The article first outlines how ‘remoteness’ was conceived and constructed during the Soviet and
post-Soviet periods in Russia. Using the ideas of the social geographer Boris Rodoman, it argues
that centric structures of power, communications and state provision created scalar zones of
non-development  and  isolation  at  borders  between  internal  administrative  regions. In  post-
Soviet times this structure continued, but according to Vladimir Kagansky it has been disturbed
by recent ‘spontaneous transformations’ whereby state international borders are becoming areas
of contact and enterprise, rather than isolation. The paper suggests to the contrary that, with the
increasing centralisation of the Putin era, Kagansky’s theory has not been realised on the Russia-
Mongolia-China border,  and that  the reduction of  border crossing points  in  fact  deepen the
residents’ sense of being situated ‘at a dead end’. However, the indigenous people living in border
zones, notably the Buryat, operate not only with these state-constructed geographies, but also
with their own quite different spatial concepts. These are so much the converse to the Russian
that they can be seen as a distinctive minoritized vision. The Buryat ideas and ritual practices
reach across political boundaries. In effect they create a subtle challenge to the spatiality of the
Russian state. It is argued that roads in this situation become particularly concentrated vectors
of contradictory values.
L’article décrit d’abord comment « l’éloignement » a été conçu et construit pendant les périodes
soviétique et post-soviétique en Russie. En utilisant les idées du géographe social Boris Rodoman,
il  fait  valoir  que  les  structures  centralisées  du  pouvoir,  les  communications  et
l’approvisionnement d’Etat créent des zones scalaires de sous-développement et d’isolement aux
limites des régions administratives internes. Bien que cette structure se soit maintenue au cours
de  la  période  post-soviétique,  elle  a,  selon  Vladimir  Kagansky,  été  remise  en  cause  par les
récentes « transformations spontanées » par lesquelles les frontières internationales deviennent
des zones de contact et d’entreprise, plutôt que d’isolement. L’article suggère au contraire que,
avec la centralisation croissante de l’ère Poutine, la théorie de Kagansky ne s’est pas vérifiée sur
la frontière Russie-Mongolie-Chine, et que la réduction du nombre de points de passage de la
frontière a en réalité contribué à approfondir le sentiment des habitants de se trouver dans une
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« impasse ».  Cependant,  les  populations  autochtones  vivant  dans  les  zones  frontalières,
notamment les Bouriates, utilisent non seulement ces géographies construites par l’État, mais
aussi leurs propres concepts spatiaux, très différents. Ces derniers sont si opposés aux concepts
russes, qu’ils peuvent être considérés comme une vision minorisée spécifique. Les idées bouriates
et les pratiques rituelles dépassent les frontières politiques. De fait, elles opposent un défi subtil à
la  spatialité  de  l’État  russe.  Dans  cette  situation,  les  routes  deviennent  des  vecteurs
particulièrement concentrés de valeurs contradictoires.
INDEX
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